We examined the economic wellbeing of the Korean elderly and their reliance on public and private transfers. Under-developed public transfer programs are at the center of heated political debates, and better understanding of economic wellbeing and the relation between public and private transfers will provide further insights in evaluating policy reform proposals under consideration. Using data from the 2006 and 2008 Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging, we found that the elderly poverty rate between 2006 and 2008 decreased significantly but was still significantly higher than other OECD countries. This poverty reduction did not benefit individuals who were older, less educated, living alone, living in rural areas, or in poor health. We found that low income elderly who co-reside depend almost completely on the income of their children or other household members. Public transfers account for no more than a third of income for low-income elderly, while private transfers accounted for half. Our analysis suggests that crowding-out is not a real concern in increasing welfare transfers for the low-income elderly.
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Introduction
The elderly population of the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) is growing rapidly: the share of persons aged 65 and over will increase from about 3% in the 1970s, to 11% today (out of about 49 million people, in total), to about 33% in the 2040s; and those aged 80 and over will pass from virtually nothing in the '70s, to 2% today, to perhaps 10% in 2040 (http://www.kosis.kr/eng). Sharply decreasing fertility, from nearly five children per woman in 1970 to just over one today, and increasing life expectancy, from just over 60 years in the early 1970s to 80 years today, are contributing to this change (KNSO 2009 ).
Economic wellbeing often declines for people at older ages. Withdrawal from the labor force and deteriorating health contribute to a greater risk of poverty. The risk of elderly poverty varies greatly across countries, particularly by the generosity of public transfers (Zaidi, Grech and Fuchs 2006) . Public transfers consist of two major components: public pension, to which individuals contribute during their working age, and welfare programs, which tend to have eligibility restrictions such as means-testing or age.
Almost all public pension programs have a redistributive component distinguishing them from private savings. Unlike those in developed countries which provide old-age income security, public pension benefits in most developing countries seldom provide adequate income support. Welfare programs in most developing countries are also quite limited. Korea has had remarkable economic growth in the past four decades and it has moved from being a developing to a developed country. Despite the country's rapid economic growth, however, the economic wellbeing of the Korean elderly remains at great risk.
The poverty rate of Koreans 60 and older in 2000 was 32% 1 Private transfers play an important role in many developing countries, including Korea, where public transfers are inadequate and traditional family solidarity is deeply rooted in the society. Yet Korean societal values have shifted with industrialization and urbanization. The erosion of traditional Confucian values has adversely influenced the economic wellbeing of the Korean elderly in two ways: decreasing levels of multigenerational co-residence where children provide old-age support (Sung 1995; Levande, Herrick and Sung 2000) and reduced financial assistance from children (Kwon 2001) .
, three times that of the non-elderly (Park et al. 2003 ): a high level partly caused by an immature pension program and limited government welfare spending.
Korean elderly face rapidly declining family support but slowly increasing public support. The adverse consequences of this shift are evident in high suicide rates among the elderly. Korean suicide rates (per 100,000 persons) are 97.3 for those aged 75 and older and 59.8 for age 65-74, while that for the general population is 21.9 (WHO 2009). Among those 75 and older, Korean suicide rates are 14 times those in the United Kingdom (6.8) and five times those in the United States (16.8) .
In this paper, we examine the economic wellbeing of Korean elderly. We first provide background on public and private transfers in Korea and the relationship between them. We then examine several measures of income and poverty for community-residing adults at least 65 years of age using the Korean
Longitudinal Study of Aging (KLoSA). We then examine sources of income for the elderly, paying particular attention to living arrangements and sharing of economic resources with co-resident adult children. We investigate the contributions of public and private transfers to old-age income security by examining the relative contributions of public and family transfers to household income for the elderly.
This is a particularly critical issue for policy reforms currently under consideration.
Public transfers in Korea
Korea first introduced a public pension scheme in 1960 with the implementation of the Government The scheme is not pay-as-you-go: it is funded through contribution. The initial contribution rate was set at 3 percent in 1988 in order to give the system popularity and stability, but it was increased to 6 percent in 1993 and to 9 percent in 1998. For average earners with 40 years of contributions, the income replacement rate was initially set at 60 percent, but fiscal problems reduced this to 50 percent in 2008, with further reductions of 0.5 percent each year, down to 40 percent by 2028.
At least 20 years of contributions are required to be eligible, and therefore only a few elderly are current beneficiaries of the NPS. The age for pension eligibility was 60 years in 2008, but this is increasing by one year each calendar year until it will reach 65 in 2013. 2 As of 2010, 19.1 million persons were enrolled in the NPS and 2.3 million received old-age pension benefits (NPS 2010) . The NPS also provides survivor benefits, annuities for disabled persons, and death benefits (one-time payments to defray funeral expenses). Divorced persons who were married at least five years during a spouse's insured period may be granted half-pension based on the marriage period once they reach age 60 (if their former spouse is already an old-age pensioner), even after re-marriage.
An age-eligible person with more than 10 but fewer than 20 years of contributions may receive a reduced old-age pension, while an early old-age pension is available at a reduced rate for persons reaching age 55 (with 55-year-old persons receiving 70 percent of benefits, and a 6-percent increase in benefits for each year one waits after age 55 to retire).
For this early stage of the NPS, a special old-age pension program was developed for those who only contributed to the scheme between five and ten years.
The National Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLSS), which is comparable to Supplemental Security Income in the United States, provides welfare benefits to the poor. Eligibility is based on means-testing and kinship: the NBLSS offers welfare benefits to those who do not have any relatives (defined as parents, spouses, children and their spouses, and siblings) legally responsible for, and capable of, supporting them. Such eligibility criteria assume that informal support mechanisms will otherwise provide full old-age income support.
In an effort to reduce elderly poverty and in implicit recognition of the weakening of kinship support 
Private (family) transfers in Korea
The erosion of traditional Confucian values has accelerated in the past five decades, beginning with the Korean War of 1950, the famine that accompanied it, and the drive for industrialization and economic growth. Traditionally, the family played a key role in supporting elders, with children, especially the eldest son, taking care of their parents (Sung 2000) . In fact, the idea of preparing in advance for one's own retirement is a relatively new concept in Korea, given the tradition of children supporting their parents as well as historically short life spans (Kim and Choe 1992; Sung 1995) .
As Confucian values have waned, clear signs of diminishing willingness to care for older parents have emerged. These signs have included declines in multigenerational co-residence (Sung 1995; Levande, Herrick, and Sung 2000) and familial support (Kwon 2001 
The relationship between public and private transfers
Theoretically, the linkage between public and private transfers depends on the motives for private transfers, among which altruism and exchange are those most commonly cited. Becker (1974) describes private transfers as altruistic behavior, by which donors compensates recipients for disparities in earnings. Altruistic households could go as far as offset any changes in public transfers with private transfers (Barro 1974) . Conversely, exchange theory views private transfers as strategic (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 1985) and posits that donors obtain utilities not only from their and recipients' consumption but also from any services resulted from transfers (e.g., child care, visits). Under exchange theory, dollar-to-dollar transfers (often referred to as Ricardian equivalence, see Feldstein 1988) will not hold.
Empirical evidence suggests a limited link between public and private transfers: an increase in public transfers reduces only slightly the frequency and amount of familial transfers (Altonji and Villanueva, 2003) . This is not necessarily inconsistent with altruism: since parents and children cannot observe each other's endogenous level of labor market effort and income (Feldstein 1988; McGarry 2000) , the limited link can be explained by imperfect information or information asymmetry rather than transfer motive.
The goal of this paper, however, is not to examine the underlying motives of transfers. Instead, we examine the strength of the relationship between public and private transfer, using panel data to illuminate whether and how sensitive private transfers are related to changes in recipient's income. We will consider potential strategic components of transfers, such as services that can trigger transfers to parents (i.e., care for grandchildren), in models of private transfers. There have been a few empirical studies on crowding-out effects, but not much is known about these in Korea. Because Korea is still in cultural transition and continuing reform efforts on public transfers, it is important to understand how private transfers will change as public transfers do so.
Data and variables
We We examine income and poverty of adults aged 65 or older, using the most recent version of KLoSA (2008), and compare the findings with 2006. In the baseline study, 4,155 respondents were 65 or older.
Of these, 3,501 were re-interviewed in 2008. Among those who were age 63 -64 in 2006 (N= 610), 534
respondents were re-interviewed in 2008.
The basic variables that we use are:
Poverty: We employ a relative measure of poverty, defining it as being below 50% of the median household income, as originally suggested by Fuchs (1969) and employed by numerous researchers (Iceland, 2005) . To account for variation in the economic needs of households of different sizes, as well as economies of scale, we used a single parameter equivalence scale with 0.5 equivalence elasticity (Burkhauser and Smeeding 1996) . But we also examine the sensitivity of outcomes by using an alternative: the OECD equivalence scale that gives different weights for additional adults (0.7) and children (0.5).
Income: KLoSA contains detailed information about different types of income that are components of aggregate income. All income values were after-tax income received in the year prior to the survey (i.e., 2005 and 2007) . Under the study design, each respondent was asked detailed questions about his or her personal income. In this study, we examine income at the family and household levels.
Total family income is the sum of respondent's and spouse's income; total household income is the sum of all household members' income. By examining income at both family and household levels, we can evaluate the economic dependence of the elderly on their children (if they co-reside).
For the 4,035 individuals at least 65 years of age in the 2008 interview, we were able to compute total family income for 3,868 by summing their itemized income. We were unable to sum family income for 161 individuals who reported being married but whose spouse was not surveyed. We also were unable to examine income portfolios for 6 other individuals due to missing values of itemized income questions.
Total household income was available for 4,020 individuals out of the 4,035, and un-reported for the remaining 15.
Among the types of personal income data in the survey are (1) earnings: wage or salary income; income from self-employment; income from a side job; (2) asset income: rental income from primary residence and other properties; interests/dividends and other investment income; (3) public pension income:
occupational pension income for government workers, military personnel, railroad workers, private teachers, and postal workers; and income from the NPS; (4) public welfare transfers: income from government programs, including income from the NBLSS; income from unemployment insurance;
workers' compensation; veterans' benefits; other welfare benefits; (5) private transfers: the total amount of financial help received. We defined financial help as giving money, helping to pay bills, or covering specific types of costs, excluding shared housing and food from the definition. Private transfers include all transfers from family and friends; and (6) other incomes such as alimony, loyalties etc.
We created a set of binary variables indicating whether a respondent or spouse received income from each source, and a set of continuous variables, indicating the share of each source of family income. The share of income refers to the total amount of income the elderly respondent and spouse received from a particular source, divided by total household income.
In estimating private transfers, we included pre-private transfer income as the determinants of the amount of private transfer. We defined pre-private transfer income as a continuous variable of total family income, excluding private transfers.
Because private transfers are influenced by donors' economic resources and service from parents to children, we include the following two binary variables. First, because KLoSA does not collect information about income for respondents' children, we included a binary variable of the children's home ownership to represent children's economic resources (base: none of the children owns a home).
Second, we employ a binary variable indicating whether a respondent or spouse of respondent provided care for grandchildren.
Control Variables:
We controlled for several time-varying characteristics of respondents: total family net-worth, living arrangements, urban/rural residence, and health status. Total family net worth is the sum of the total financial and non-financial wealth for a respondent and spouse less their debts. We categorized living arrangements as living alone; living with spouse (base); living with adult children (with or without spouse); and living with others. We used a binary variable to indicate whether a respondent resides in urban or rural area, and a categorical variable of self-reported health status ranging from very poor to poor, fair, good, and very good health. We also control for respondent's demographic characteristics such as age, gender and education.
Models and research questions
We first report the poverty status of the Korean elderly by key socio-demographic characteristics, using the 2008 wave, with two equivalence scales. Since age, gender, living arrangements, urban/rural residence, health status, and education are known risk factors of poverty, we report the poverty rate (i.e., the percentage of the poor) for each sub-population. To account for design effects due to the sampling design, descriptive statistics are weighted and the standard errors are produced in accordance with the sampling design.
Using both waves of data, we then look into changes in poverty rate. We decompose such changes, first by looking into the changes in sample, separately for those who dropped out after the first interview and those who remained keeping their socio-demographic characteristics under control.
Second, we investigate the relative contribution of public and private transfers to old-age income security, by examining their income portfolios. In describing income portfolios of the elderly, we present first the sources of household income, indicating the proportion of elderly household receiving income from particular income sources (e.g., public transfers), and second the share of total household income from each family income source. We again look into the changes in income portfolio over time, specifically focusing on public and private transfers.
Finally, we will examine the relationship between public and private transfers by investigating the amounts of private transfers received in relation to family's pre-transfer incomes, using two waves of data available. Based on the exchange model of transfer, the amount of private transfer received by the i th individual at time t (t=0, 1), PrivT t,i , is modeled as a function of respondent's Pre-transfer income t,i , economic status of children who are primary provider for the elderly, Child_ES t,i , care of grandchildren as service to children, Care_G t,i , and other time varying (X t,i ) and time invariant (Z i ) control variables:
In the above model, α is an intercept. β 1 is the effect of pre-transfer income. β 2 is the effect of children's socioeconomic status. β 3 is the effect parents service to children. The time effect β 0 t is used to account for the natural growth trend. The following time-varying control variables are included in X t,i :
respondent's total family net-worth, living arrangements, urban/rural residence, and health status. The time-invariant variables (Z i ) include demographic information. Also included in Z i is a dummy variable for the individual-level (fixed) effect.
Given that only two waves of data are available, the mean difference, or equivalently, the first-order difference is an efficient and consistent approach to fitting the panel data model (Greene 2003; Yang and Tsiatis 2001) . The first-order difference approach also adds additional benefits when there are measurement errors in the covariates (Liker et al., 1985) . After taking first-order difference, the model (hereafter referred to as the first difference model) becomes:
where the intercept β 0 results from the time effect. All financial variables are in the log scale before differencing. In fitting the first difference model, we have also adjusted for the survey design information, including the clusters, strata, and longitudinal sampling weights.
At first glance, the time-invariant covariates Z i should not appear in the first difference model (2), because ΔZ i = 0. Nevertheless, this omission is valid under the assumption that the same time effect is shared among all individuals in the population, whereas some subgroups, e.g., female and male, may instead have distinct growth trends. This heterogeneity in time effect can be parameterized by the interaction term between Z i and time t in (1) . Note that the interaction tZ i is time-varying by itself, and Δ(tZ i )=Z i . This leads to the appearance of Z i in the first difference model, where we also control for gender, education, and age.
Results

Poverty
First, we examine poverty rates of the Korean elderly aged 65 and older in 2008, using cross-sectional weights to obtain national representation (Table 3) . We estimate the poverty rate to be 26%, using both the OECD equivalence scale and the single equivalence scale with elasticity = 0.5. This is significantly lower than the 32% rate we estimated from the 2006 KLoSA, using the same single equivalence scale (Lee and Lee, 2009 conversely, they received a significantly larger share of their income from pensions, private transfers, and other household members' income. Several of these shifts suggest that government welfare transfers may significantly affect private transfers, particularly for low-and middle-income individuals. ** TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE **
Crowding-out Private Transfers?
A possible crowding-out effect of public transfers on private transfers is suggested both in the baseline analysis of KLoSA data (Lee and Lee, 2009 ) and our descriptive longitudinal analysis. 
Discussion
While we found that overall poverty decreased for elderly individuals in Korea between 2006 and 2008, it did not do so for all individuals. In particular individuals who were older, less educated, living alone, living in a rural area, or in poor health did not see their poverty rate decrease, or not significantly.
For individuals in the lowest-income bracket, welfare transfers increased both as a source of income and as a share of total household income. Also for low-income individuals, private transfers increased as a source of household income but decreased as a share of total household income. This suggests that a greater proportion of elderly receive private transfers, but that the relative contribution of private transfers to elderly household income has reduced. Taken together, these findings suggest that both public and private transfers make significant contributions to the financial wellbeing of the elderly and that the increase in welfare transfers for low-income individuals was coupled with decreased family support.
Middle-income elderly saw large reductions in welfare transfers but increases in private transfers.
Private transfers increased both as a source and a share of household income for middle-income individuals. Public pensions also increased as a source of income, but its share remains unchanged. As public pensions mature, we anticipate their continued growth as a share of household income.
High-income elderly also experienced increases in private transfers and pension income. Public-pension income increased both as a source and share of income for the high-income elderly.
Our results do not suggest a crowding-out effect of increases in pre-transfer income on private transfers but instead that increases in pre-transfer income have a positive impact on private transfers. That is, as the elderly receive more income from other sources, they also receive more money from their family members. Our analysis also suggests that private transfers increase as children's economic status does but that such transfers are not affected by changes in the amount of service an elderly parent provides for their grandchildren. These findings suggest that children provide for their elderly parents, not in response to the services provided to them but, instead, to the extent of their ability to provide for their elderly parents.
Conclusion
Economic wellbeing of the Korean elderly depends on public and private transfers. We examined the economic wellbeing of the elderly and their reliance on public and private transfers in several ways.
First, we estimated poverty status based on equivalized household income. We then examined household income portfolios, disaggregating household incomes for respondents, spouses, and co-residing household members. We then broke down the elderly's family income by source: earnings, asset income, public pension income, welfare transfer income, private transfer income, and other sources of income.
We found that 26 percent of Korean elderly (i.e., individuals at age 65 or older) lived in poverty in 2008.
Compared with other OECD countries, the poverty risk is substantially higher for Korean elderly. We found a significant decrease in the elderly poverty rate between 2006 and 2008, from 32 to 26 percent.
But poverty reduction has not benefited individuals who were older, less educated, living alone, living in a rural area, or in poor health.
Household income portfolio analyses illuminate the economic dependence of the elderly through coresidence. Low-income elderly who co-reside receive more than 90 percent of their income from the children or the other household members with whom they co-reside. Most low-income elderly living alone or only with a spouse receive welfare or private transfer income. Welfare transfers account for no more than a third of income for low-income elderly, while private transfers accounted for about half.
Nevertheless, welfare transfers grew as a proportion of income for low-income elderly between 2006 and 2008, while private transfers decreased. This suggests the BOASP has helped reduce elderly poverty.
We also observed a slight increase in public pension income, especially among high-income elderly. As the public-pension program matures, we anticipate its growth as a share of income for the elderly.
Our analyses of the relationship between elderly respondents' family income before private transfer and the private transfers they received suggest that crowding-out is not a real concern in increasing welfare transfers for the low-income elderly. Using the first difference model, we found a positive relationship between the changes in income for the elderly income and changes in private transfers received, specifically that a 1 percent increase in elderly family income (through the increase in public transfer), will increase the private transfer income by 0.07 percent. We also find that the changes in children's economic status influences the changes in private transfer income, suggesting that if public transfer program influences children's income (e.g., increased tax burden), then it will negatively influence the elderly's private transfer income. Further analyses are needed to estimate the aggregate effects with more detailed data on children's income. 
